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2025年7月27日

A Comparison of Contemporary Thought and Mahayana Buddhism: Realism vs. Śūnyatā (Emptiness), Madhyamaka vs. Post-structuralism

Introduction

Contemporary philosophy and Mahayana Buddhism are, in essence, the same school of thought.

To state the conclusion first, they share the corresponding relationships outlined below. This article aims to explain these parallels.

Contemporary Philosophy and Buddhism Are Ultimately the Same

To begin with the conclusion, contemporary thought (contemporary philosophy) and Mahayana Buddhism are the same.

To be more precise, the structuralism of contemporary philosophy is the same as the Buddhist theory of Śūnyatā (空論, kūron, emptiness). Furthermore, a part of contemporary post-structuralism is the same as the Buddhist theory of Madhyamaka (中観論, chūgan-ron).

Strictly speaking, while we can equate structuralism with Śūnyatā, it is the portion of post-structuralism that remains after subtracting structuralism and various other elements that aligns with Madhyamaka.

Fortunately, we now have the convenient term “metacognition.” In a single word, both Madhyamaka and this refined essence of post-structuralism can be described as “metacognition.”

Metacognition is the act of cognizing cognition itself.

So, what does one cognize? In short, it is the various ways of thinking. This includes philosophies, theories, modes of thought, information processing methods, morals (i.e., principles of action), and ideologies. In high school social studies terms, it encompasses ethics, religion, philosophy, and more. One could even argue that subjects like language, math, science, and social studies—and the various theories within them like those in chemistry—are all ways of thinking, methods of information processing, philosophies, and ideologies. Regarding language, while we cannot know the inner world of those without it, a speaker of a language (or a multilingual person using one of their languages) can be seen as thinking based on that language’s cognitive structure.

Using a computer analogy, metacognition is the Operating System (OS), while other ways of thinking are applications.

Historically, applications were discovered before the OS. In Buddhism, the first thing the Buddha, Śākyamuni, realized was Śūnyatā (dependent origination, the five aggregates are all empty). Subsequently, the Middle Way (中道, chūdō) was inevitably derived as a consequence. In contemporary philosophy, structuralism was discovered first. As a result, post-structuralism was also inevitably derived. It may seem natural that the application comes before the OS, as we typically use applications—or software running on the OS—without being conscious of the OS itself.

The History of Philosophy Has Revolved Around Realism

Major world powers—nations with scriptural religions, those modernizing, and those already modernized (where modernization can be equated with Westernization)—are often thought to perceive things dually. However, a closer look reveals this is not always the case. More often, things are divided into a singular dominant idea versus “the rest.”

Modernization: Eurocentrism vs. the rest.
Religion: Exclusive monotheism vs. the rest.
Politics/Society/Economics: Liberalism vs. the rest.
Philosophy: Realism vs. the rest.

A common source of confusion in these discussions is a cognitive bias that tends to interpret “the rest”—which should be understood as “non-“—as “anti-“. The difference is whether they are mutually exclusive. For example, the political divide between liberalism and “the rest” is often misunderstood. “The rest” is sometimes called conservative or right-wing. However, “anti-liberalism” is a stance that opposes and conflicts with liberalism, whereas “non-liberalism” can comfortably include liberalism. This is why conservative discourse in Japan and its ruling party have traditionally encompassed a wide range of ideas, including liberal ones. The definitions of liberal and non-liberal also change with time and across countries, making it confusing for non-specialists.

Furthermore, we tend to think of these as opposites on the same axis—like points on a number line—when they may exist on entirely different dimensions, leading to discussions that fail to connect.

In philosophy, realism has been a constant presence since antiquity and was a central theme of debate in medieval theology. In developmental psychology, a child’s development proceeds from sensory-motor and intuitive aspects—seeing and thinking about the “thing” (物, mono) side of reality—to the later development of abstraction, mental manipulation, and conceptualization, which is the “event” or “matter” (事, koto) side of reality. Because of this, realism tends to be deeply ingrained in the human psyche and is often considered self-evident.

Looking at the history from medieval theology to modern philosophy, the pattern is as follows:

Theology: Realism vs. Nominalism (as “the rest”).
Early Modernity: Continental Rationalism (a type of realism) vs. British Empiricism (as “the rest”).
Later Modernity: Realism vs. German Idealism, vs. parts of Nietzschean existentialism, vs. phenomenology, and vs. structuralism. Finally, within the framework of contemporary post-structuralism, this structure of opposition and contrast was successfully organized, bringing a form of resolution to modern Western philosophy.

The Uniqueness of Buddhism: Western vs. Eastern Thought

If Euro-centric modern civilization developed in this way, Eastern thought is its inverse.

Over 2,500 years ago, a genius named Śākyamuni appeared and single-handedly anticipated and established what would become structuralism and post-structuralism in modern Western philosophy, spreading it across Asia.

While Western philosophy’s history was a conflict between realism and “the rest,” in Buddhism, the thought corresponding to “the rest” was not “anti-realism.” It became the mainstream while encompassing realism without denying it. Therefore, in Eastern thought, what is considered the conclusion or end-point in Western philosophy is the starting point, leading to a completely different historical trajectory.

Japan, as one of the world’s few Mahayana Buddhist nations, can be seen as an exceptionally unique civilization from the perspective of Westerners and others. Because Mahayana Buddhism is often subtle and less assertive in its claims, it has historically been suppressed or destroyed for various reasons. This has made Japan stand out, for better or worse, and has often led to discussions of Japanese exceptionalism.

Why is Realism Dominant? “Thing” and “Event,” “Thing-ness” and “Event-ness”

Realism is an easy-to-understand way of thinking. Let’s provisionally call any object of our awareness a “thing-event” (monogoto). Any “thing-event” in the world has the properties of a “thing” and an “event.”

The “thing” aspect (mono) is material and sensory. Let’s call this its “thing-ness” (物性, bussei). This sounds a bit like Heidegger. The “event” aspect (koto) is the side that is cognitively processed in the mind or spirit after being sensed. It is abstract: concepts, ideas, representations, thoughts, imagination. It can also be what we might call perceptions or realizations—the feeling of reality, the sense of knowing or understanding—as well as symbolic aspects like names and various functions or properties.

Most objects we can cognize likely have both properties. A “thing” is what can be perceived by the senses. It is difficult to argue that an object placed before you, which you can both see and touch, does not exist. To claim that something perceivable by the five senses through repeated confirmation is non-existent would be absurd.

However, even things perceived by the five senses have aspects beyond them. They have names, can be used as tools, analyzed chemically, and hold meaning within a society or culture. These are the “event” properties of a “thing-event.” When we grasp things in terms of their cognitive or functional meaning or their relationship with other things, these aspects come to the forefront.

The Buddha understood a human being as a composite of the Five Aggregates (五蘊, go-un): form, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness.

Form (色, shiki): The material, sensory part of a thing-event.
Sensation (受, ju): Feelings or sensations.
Perception (想, sō): Representations or concepts.
Mental Formations (行, gyō): Will, intentions, actions.
Consciousness (識, shiki): Recognition or awareness.

The “thing-ness” is covered by form and sensation. The “event-ness” is covered by sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness. This perspective is similar to that of Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason.

What are Śūnyatā and Structuralism? Their Difference from Realism

First, contemporary structuralism corresponds to the Buddhist theory of Śūnyatā (空論, kūron). These represent the completed form of non-realism.

Realism is the philosophy of “reality” (実, jitsu), while Śūnyatā is the philosophy of “emptiness” (空, kū). The problem here is that Western thought, knowledge, concepts, and language have no direct equivalent for kū. One could even say that the history of Western philosophy has been a continuous effort to discover, invent, and express something equivalent to kū in opposition to realism.

The Medieval Problem of Universals and Śūnyatā

Let’s trace the history of Western thought from the Middle Ages. In medieval theology, the problem of universals pitted realism against nominalism. Realism, as the name suggests, is the idea that universals (essences) exist in reality—that there is a real substance. In contrast, nominalism argued that substance does not truly exist; we merely give names to things that we perceive as having reality, thereby making them seem real. This convoluted explanation was necessary because the word kū did not exist. From the perspective of Śūnyatā or structuralism, names and the words that contain them are just some of the components that construct emptiness.

Continental Rationalism, British Empiricism, and Śūnyatā

Moving from the Middle Ages through the Renaissance to the early modern period, we see the rise of Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism. Rationalism is a type of realism, positing that reason and rationality are pre-existing, real entities within humans and possibly the world. Empiricism, on the other hand, argues that there is no pre-formed reason or rationality; such things are shaped posthumously through experience. In the language of Śūnyatā or structuralism, “experience” becomes a component for constructing emptiness. It’s like a job applicant’s resume or portfolio; a hiring manager uses these documents (the applicant’s experience) to make a decision without ever meeting the person in “reality.” The “reality” of a face-to-face meeting does not exist at this stage.

Descartes’s Dualism and Śūnyatā

Descartes founded his philosophy on the intuitive reality of the self. The logic is that since the self has reality, what has reality must exist. Ultimately, Descartes grounds his philosophy in the “sincerity of God,” meaning God’s existence guarantees the existence of everything else, whether created objects or the mind. He proposed a method of elemental reductionism: breaking down a whole to understand its parts, then reassembling them to understand the whole. The question is what happens during this reassembly. Does it create a new substance (the realist position), or does it not (the structuralist/Śūnyatā position)?

German Idealism and Śūnyatā

German Idealism was an attempt to resolve the “half-heartedness” of Kant’s compromise between rationalism and empiricism by explaining everything through a monism of ideas. Kant created a very modern epistemology where the “thing-in-itself” is processed by reason, understanding, and sensibility to form our perception. However, this created a dilemma by separating the “thing-ness” of the thing-in-itself from the conceptual “event-ness” of reason. German Idealism aimed to resolve this by proposing an idealist monism, where even the thing-in-itself and its “thing-ness” are created by ideas. From the perspective of Śūnyatā, the components that construct emptiness might be “ideas,” Fichte’s “obstacle,” or Hegel’s dialectical structure.

Husserl’s Phenomenology and Śūnyatā

Husserl’s phenomenology brackets (epoché) questions of external reality and substance to focus solely on the phenomena that appear with certainty in the mind. The question of whether “a substance exists, therefore it appears in consciousness” or “it exists because it appears in consciousness” is a later step in thinking. The founder, Husserl, argued that we must separate these questions. From this standpoint, realism is the position that because something is present to consciousness (genzen), we feel its reality and thus conclude that a substance exists. In contrast, the Śūnyatā perspective is that this phenomenon, this presence, is merely one of the constituent parts of emptiness.

Nietzsche’s Philosophy and Śūnyatā

While existentialism doesn’t always deal with ontology or epistemology, some existentialists like Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre did. Nietzsche, in particular, developed a philosophy that is virtually identical to Śūnyatā. This is not found in his moral ideas like the eternal return or the Übermensch, but in his assertions that the world is chaos, that ressentiment and the will to power dynamically shape our perception and worldview, and that “God is dead.” Nietzsche believed that our world is fundamentally incomprehensible—a chaos—but that psychic drives, both positive (like the will to power) and negative (like ressentiment), form a corresponding perception and mode of being. This is identical to modern structuralism and to the Buddhist concepts of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) and Nāgārjuna’s Śūnyatā. In this philosophy, realism is demoted from the center to a mere artificial creation.

Other Western Thought and Śūnyatā

Around the time of Nietzsche, movements like structuralism, formalism, axiomatism, and logicism emerged in mathematics and linguistics, followed by relationist theories like set theory and category theory. These are already expressions of Śūnyatā. In the natural sciences, quantum theory emerged. While not the same as Śūnyatā, it offers a way of seeing things that encompasses and generalizes classical realism, presenting a worldview entirely alien to those familiar only with classical science and philosophy.

A Look at Realism and Non-realism from the Perspective of Śūnyatā and Structuralism

The 20th century can be described as the century in which the structuralist view permeated and spread among intellectuals and the general public. By the mid-20th century, Lévi-Strauss had pushed structuralism to the center of the intellectual world. Simultaneously, various academic fields that had been built on realism were being reconstructed with structuralism.

It’s worth noting that structuralism is an “-ism.” While some consider an “-ism” an ideology, it can also be just a methodology or a technique. Taking the latter view, structuralism became the new foundation and principle for various fields of study, which had previously operated on an unconscious premise of realism. The “four horsemen” of structuralism—Lévi-Strauss in cultural anthropology, Lacan in psychoanalysis (structuring the psyche), Althusser in Marxism, and Foucault in the social and human sciences—led this charge. Essentially, the foundations of formal disciplines like mathematics and logic, as well as the natural and human sciences built upon them, were all structuralized. A famous example is the Bourbaki group’s effort to rewrite all of mathematics using structuralist principles.

Summary of Śūnyatā and Structuralism

We’ve discussed Descartes’s method of understanding the world by breaking it down and then synthesizing the parts. This worked in the past, but today’s objects are made of an immense number and variety of complex parts—cars, airplanes, weapons, computers.

Consider an AI-powered robot or android. This is a common theme in science fiction and a relevant issue today with discussions of the AI singularity. The core question is: what happens if an AI develops a self, a consciousness? In Japan, robots and machines have long been anthropomorphized and treated with emotional attachment. In contrast, the world’s dominant Abrahamic religions (Christianity, Islam, Judaism) posit a strict hierarchy where God, humans, and other creatures are essentially different. God is the Creator, and everything else is His creation. Among creations, humans are special, made in God’s image. This worldview is inherently distinctive, hierarchical, and realist. To claim that God or His creations do not exist as real substances is highly problematic. This is why, in the medieval problem of universals, nominalism was often seen as heretical.

While Japan’s Astro Boy and Doraemon are treated like humans, Western films often show a great deal of anxiety around this topic. In 2001: A Space Odyssey, the protagonist’s terror and confusion when the AI, HAL, develops a self makes the film feel like a panic-horror movie. In the cyberpunk classic Blade Runner, the moment a replicant (an android) develops a self is initially portrayed with fear but ultimately depicted movingly. Perhaps in the West, the self is seen as something like a soul, the very substance of a human being. The theme becomes what happens when an “empty” (kū) thing like a computer or AI acquires “reality” (jitsu). When complexity theory was popular, there was a saying: “Complex things have a mind.” In Japan, however, it is considered normal and even part of the culture to feel a spirit or presence in mountains, rivers, plants—even in nothing at all.

Emptiness is Made from Parts

We have traced the flow of non-realist thought in Western philosophy as it developed in relation to realism. Non-realist ideas took many forms: nominalism in medieval theology, British empiricism in early modern Europe, German idealism in the height of modern philosophy, and phenomenology in the transition to the contemporary era.

Why did it take so many different forms and require such varied explanations? Because the word and concept for Śūnyatā (emptiness) were missing.

Instead, these philosophies were expressed using the “parts” that make up emptiness. This was later well-summarized by structuralists like Lacan and subsequent post-structuralists.

Nominalism proposed “names, symbols” as the parts.
British Empiricism proposed “experience”.
German Idealism proposed “ideas”.
Phenomenology proposed “phenomena, presence”.

Non-realism includes realism. Since it is not anti-realism, it does not exclude realism; there is no strange exclusionism. Therefore, realism itself contributes parts for constructing emptiness: “matter” and “things perceivable by the senses.”

In Lacan’s thinking, these parts are synthesized and assembled to create emptiness. You could just as well say they create “reality” or “substance.” However, the modern perspective is that it is unnecessary to presuppose a substance. Śūnyatā and realism are not mutually exclusive ideologies. Being able to use both perspectives simultaneously is a key aspect of post-structuralism.

A Brief Explanation of Post-structuralism

The term “post-structuralism” is a compound of the Latin prefix “post-” and “structuralism.” “Post” means “after” or “next.” Interestingly, the equivalent word in Classical Greek is “meta.”

While “meta” is now often used to mean “beyond” or “above,” this usage dates from Aristotle and his influence. Its original meaning was the same as “post”: “after” or “next.”

The transition from structuralism to post-structuralism in contemporary thought was very messy, so classifying it by period was perhaps a good idea at the time. However, from our current standpoint, where we can calmly and objectively organize the situation, it would be more appropriate to either give post-structuralism a completely different name or, if we want to keep the word “structuralism,” call it meta-structuralism. Here, “meta” would be used in the modern sense, as in Aristotle’s Metaphysics or Meta, the parent company of Facebook.

Simple Post-structuralism

Though the term wasn’t mainstream back then, there is now a perfect word to describe post-structuralism: “metacognition.”

Post-structuralism is a way of thinking that applies metacognition to any and all philosophies, ways of thinking, scientific theories, religions, and ideologies. Therefore, a more fitting name would be “Metacognition-ism.”

Buddhism has words for this metacognitive stance. The Buddha called it the “Middle Way” (中道, chūdō), Nāgārjuna called it “Middle View” (中観, chūgan), and the Tiantai master Zhiyi called it the “Middle” (中, chū). Western thought lacked such a word, which is likely why it was named post-structuralism. However, the term “post-structuralism” is a mix of too many things, making it unclear what it refers to.

It is helpful to think of it with the following formula:

“Post-structuralism in a new sense” = “Metacognition of thought” = “Post-structuralism” – “Structuralist philosophies” – “Realist philosophies” – “Other miscellaneous elements”

Understood this way, “post-structuralism in a new sense” becomes identical to “Metacognition-ism” and the Buddhist concepts of the Middle Way, Middle View, and the Middle.

**How Contemporary Philosophy Expresses Kū and Chū Without the Words**

Lacking original words and corresponding concepts makes it difficult to express and name new ideas.

For the core of post-structuralism (Chū), we can now use “metacognition.” In the past, terms like “relativism” were used. In Buddhism, it is simply the Middle Way, Middle View, or the Middle. (Note that this is different from the Confucian “Doctrine of the Mean,” chūyō).

For emptiness (Kū), there is still no perfectly fitting concept. Perhaps it would be best to just use the word “kū“ directly, much like how the Daoist “Tao” (道) is used. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to express it:

As we’ve seen: nominalism (“name, sign, symbol”), empiricism (“tabula rasa”), idealism (“idea, spirit”), phenomenology (“phenomenon, presence”).
In the age of structuralism: “structure,” Lévi-Strauss’s “bricolage,” Lacan’s diagrams like the Borromean knot (the interplay of the Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real).
Foucault used phrases like “the end of man” or “the end of history.”
In modern mathematics, perhaps “undefined term” or “undefined concept.”
Derrida, one of the three giants of post-structuralism along with Foucault and Deleuze/Guattari, used the word “différance,” which may be close. The word “deconstruction” might also work.
Deleuze and Guattari seem to be trying to express something corresponding to kū through various terms like “(body without) organs,” “rhizome,” “nomad,” and “particle.”

Perhaps all of these capture a certain aspect of emptiness, but none feel entirely complete. It’s important to note that kū is different from “nothingness” (無, mu), “void” (虚, kyo), and Taoist concepts like “non-action” (無為, mui).

Meanwhile, Mahayana Buddhist countries like Japan have used the concept of kū in interesting ways. For example, Japanese scholars of Dutch learning coined the word “air” (空気, kūki, literally “empty-spirit”). This word has taken on a fascinating social usage, as famously analyzed by the biblical scholar Shichihei Yamamoto in his book “The Study of ‘Air'”. We have phrases like “can’t read the air” (kūki yomenai), “creating an atmosphere,” and “pouring cold water on the atmosphere.” There is a profound statement in the Bible: “Man cannot live without spirit (pneuma, breath, psyche) and water.”

Conclusion

Contemporary philosophy is the same as the Three Truths doctrine (三諦論, santai-ron) of Mahayana Buddhism.

Contemporary philosophy consists of structuralism and post-structuralism.
The term “post-structuralism” covers a messy field, including non-realist structuralism, realist philosophies, and other elements.

The Three Truths doctrine, summarized by the Tiantai master Zhiyi, consists of the Middle (chū), Emptiness (kū), and the Provisional/Temporary (ke or 仮).

Ignoring the finer details, we can draw a direct correspondence:

Contemporary Philosophy = Mahayana Buddhism
The Core of Post-structuralism = The Middle (chū, chūgan, chūdō)
Structuralism = The Theory of Emptiness (kūron)

The third truth, the Provisional, corresponds to the various realist and non-realist philosophies themselves, which are the objects of metacognition.

I have summarized my thoughts in this humble article in the hope that understanding this correspondence and framework will make both Mahayana Buddhism and contemporary philosophy easier to grasp.

A Comparison of Contemporary Thought and Mahayana Buddhism: Realism vs. Śūnyatā (Emptiness), Madhyamaka vs. Post-structuralism